Abstract. Historians generally agree that the "classic era" of narcotics control, a period of punitive drug policies and limited treatment options, came to an end in the early 1960s along with, among other things, the emergence of methadone maintenance treatment for heroin addiction. But methadone was not the only treatment model competing to replace the punitive system; throughout the 1960s therapeutic communities also competed for funding and political legitimacy. A close examination of the debate between promoters of these different approaches complicates the progressive narrative of addiction policy moving seamlessly from punitive and conservative to sympathetic and liberal approaches. A compromised treatment infrastructure that combined methadone, therapeutic communities, and criminal justice approaches to addiction, ultimately emerged from the conflict -a compromise that retained key elements of the carceral approach while minimizing the boldest challenges to it, thus laying the groundwork for the drug wars that followed.
IntroductIon "Chemistry is the new hope" for the intractable problem of heroin addiction, read the headline of a New York Times feature in March of 1971. The statement was a revelation because addiction was understood as an intractable problem; addicts were a "hopeless" population, resistant to moral or psychiatric intervention. The article described how, after "five years of waiting and hoping," New York City's elected officials had turned away from ineffective psychotherapy and toward the new chemical solution of methadone maintenance, an outpatient drug treatment for heroin addiction. 1 The early 1970s were a period of expansion for methadone; the Times piece was preceded by favorable coverage in popular periodicals, including Look, Time, and Science Digest.
2 Yet ten years later, the co-founder of methadone maintenance Vincent Dole lamented the popular emphasis on a new "cure" for the complex problem of addiction. "Some people became overly converted" to the therapy, Dole claimed. "The stupidity of thinking that just giving methadone will solve a complicated social problem is to me beyond comprehension." 3 Methadone did not solve the complicated social problem of addiction, but it did alter the medical and political establishment's approach to it. The innovative application of methadone to heroin addiction marked the end of what historian David Courtwright termed the "classic era" of narcotics control, in which harsh drug laws limited treatment options to detoxification programs and penitentaries. 4 Methadone, which had been in use as an aid for detoxification since the 1940s, suddenly had boosters. The drug also had detractors. Synanon, a drug-free California commune for narcotic addicts, was founded in 1958; by the mid-1960s, its methods had inspired a new network of "therapeutic community" (TC) treatment centers. Therapeutic community advocates were equally influential participants in the treatment revolution that brought about the end of the classic era of narcotics control. Their philosophy of recovery, however, stood in stark contrast to the biomedical methadone maintenance model. The debate between the two therapeutic camps profoundly influenced the shift in drug treatment and policy that occurred in the latter decades of the twentieth century.
Most alcohol and drug historians have overlooked therapeutic community advocates' impact on addiction treatment, concentrating instead on mutual aid groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous or on biomedical breakthroughs in treatment such as methadone or buprenorphine maintenance. 5 Re-examining the influence of the emerging TC treatment model complicates the progressive history of addiction treatment that tracks a straightforward path from punitive, conservative addiction policies to more friendly liberal modalities like methadone maintenance. In order to understand the swift return to harsh (albeit revised) drug policies that followed the brief period of therapeutic experimentation in the 1960s, we must first understand how the politicization of both TCs and methadone laid the foundation for the development of the drug treatment industry. Drug treatment that emerged at the end of the classic era was not simply an alternative to incarceration; it was also a complement.
Addiction treatments, by definition, are oriented toward restoring social functioning, as historians, critics, and treatment providers themselves have shown. Sociologist Scott Vrecko has called addiction treatments "civilizing technologies," suggesting that even seemingly apolitical approaches to the addiction problem offer clues for understanding civilizations -that is, the social and historical contexts of therapeutic inventions. 6 The historical context in which therapeutic communities and methadone maintenance emerged influenced the social and political meaning assigned to their treatments.
Telling this story is significant in that it counters the notion that addiction policies in the twentieth century have been top-down, large-scale government endeavors dreamed up by politicians and bureaucrats like Harry J. Anslinger. For example, the idea that Richard Nixon's concern over returning heroinaddicted Vietnam veterans caused him to support the expansion of home-grown addiction treatment is overly simplistic.
7 Disenfranchised ex-addicts who developed the TC model were instrumental in promoting it as a viable alternative to the classic era system. Likewise, methadone maintenance pioneer Vincent Dole and his partner Marie Nyswander developed their treatment method outside the epicenter of government-sponsored narcotic research in the midcentury United States, the US Public Health Service hospital/penitentiary in Lexington, Kentucky.
Historian Nancy Campbell noted that the Lexington penitentiary was presented as a "New Deal for the drug addict," with the $3.6 million-dollar facility being "portrayed as an institutional solution to a problem of national scope that crosscut racial, ethnic, and class divisions." 8 Lexington thus represented big-government social engineering that aligned with many other FDR-era solutions. Methadone maintenance pioneers espoused a subtler sort of liberalism. Methadone was brought to the U.S. from Germany as a "spoil" of World War II and was used in Lexington to wean addicts off heroin since 1948 (Table 1) . "Maintaining" addicts on the drug -or dispensing it on an outpatient basiswas considered medically risky by Lexington's lead researchers. 9 The suite of treatment services offered at Lexington was a synthesis of old and new fashions in addiction treatment and research: nineteenth century pastoral labor, Freudian psychoanalysis, ambitious drug trials. The narcotic farms took on a political symbolism that was almost as important as the therapies they employed; as sky-high relapse rates were leaked to the public, the project came to be perceived as a big-government failure, coercive and wasteful. Methadone maintenance seemed an enlightened and efficient alternative.
In the mid-1960s, the twilight years of what has been called the "golden age of American medicine," 10 methadone pioneers Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander believed that the solution to the medical problem of addiction was not to corral heroin users into massive treatment centers, but to grant addicts access to supervised, clinic-based medical care. The first methadone maintenance clinics began in 1964 as a local experiment in New York City; as the clinics proliferated, their leadership accepted the necessity of government support and regulation for the sake of promoting patients' social mobility. This revived medical model of addiction reduced social stigma against heroin addicts, but it did so without absolving addicts of their responsibility for their own economic advancement once their medical status had stabilized. The philosophical subtext was liberalism in an almost classical sense: methadone maintenance was an Enlightenment-style investment, rooted in scientific advancement, individualism, and a commitment to promoting equality of freemarket opportunity. It should come as no surprise that Dole's early methadone trials were bankrolled in part by the Rockefeller Foundation.
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In contrast, the ex-addicts who staffed some of the first therapeutic communities in the 1960s often billed themselves as radicals. They believed that American society had grown permissive and vice-ridden. A booming market of licit and illicit drugs was for them a primary example of the moral indulgence that characterized a society in decline. From this perspective, Lexington's sin was not its size but its fervent search for pharmaceutical cures. Synanon and other early TCs preferred nineteenth century pastoral labor; they sent initiates to work at "character-building" activities, such as cleaning dishes or mopping floors. By the time Synanon was founded in 1958, mainstream society had traveled so far from such regimens that the neo-Victorian approach to addiction was a fringe affair. 12 But it was also on the cutting edge; seminal TC founders such as David Deitch of Daytop and John Maher of Delancey Street viewed addiction recovery as a vehicle for transformative, disciplinary social reforms. As a result, the countercultural posture of many early TCs could align with social conservatism, despite the political inclinations of some staffers.
Methadone maintenance and TCs were politically multivalent "civilizing technologies." The previous recovery success story, Alcoholics Anonymous, was a mutual aid society that had helped humanize the nation's approach to the treatment of alcoholics. In contrast, methadone maintenance clinics and therapeutic communities were not support groups; they were "treatment," a designation that came with expectations of time-limited care, professional supervision, ethical and legal guidelines, and record-keeping. 13 These bureaucratic elements were open to external scrutiny and regulation, and treatment advocates eventually found that support for their new programs was not entirely benevolent. By the time the Rockefeller Drug Laws were passed in 1973, methadone maintenance was being promoted as a method of crime control.
14 Due in part to a politically motivated schism at an influential therapeutic community in 1968, the TC establishment modified their original goal of transforming a depraved society, and concentrated instead on refashioning a subpopulation of "immoral" individuals. The ideologies espoused by TC and methadone advocates shifted as the models were institutionalized, but -for the sake of efficiency and consistency -this article classifies methadone advocates' philosophy as aligned with classical liberalism, while TC advocates represented a new brand of countercultural conservatism.
Scholarship on alcohol and drugs offers a range of explanations for the historical shift from conservative to liberal drug policy approaches in the 1960s. David Musto, David Courtwright, and Caroline Acker have demonstrated how and why legal, medical, and political approaches to opiate use shifted over the course of the twentieth century; the appeals of methadone and TC advocates, and their subsequent influence on policy, are also well documented. 15 In contrast, this article does not focus on advocates' modest success in overturning classical era approaches to addiction recovery, but rather pays closer attention to their failures. Why were crucial aspects of methadone maintenance and TC philosophies minimized as the treatments were mainstreamed? Popular and historical wisdom has used the famous cases of Prohibition, narcotics farms, and mass incarceration to frame U.S. alcohol and drug policies as ideologically-driven failures on a massive scale. This article explores why other, equally bold solutions to the addiction problem were never fully implemented.
tHe orIgIns of tHerApeutIc communItIes Methadone maintenance and therapeutic communities arose from different institutional settings -the federal penitentiary and the California commune -before becoming neighbors in New York City boroughs. The treatment models were based on different philosophies of addiction recovery: methadone maintenance was a biomedical model, while therapeutic communities were framed as a developmental one. These contradictory ideas about the root causes of addiction emerged early in the treatment models' histories and set the terms for debate about addiction policy in the mid-1960s.
The first debate broke out in an Alcoholics Anonymous clubhouse when Charles "Chuck" Dederich, a recovering alcoholic, left his local AA chapter and started his own group for heroin addicts in an Ocean Park storefront. The first U.S. therapeutic community, which Dederich later called Synanon, grew out of his followers' dissatisfaction with the AA model. AA leadership and local groups were distrustful of drug addicts, and Dederich and his followers likely perceived the original offshoot Narcotics Anonymous -which was incorporated in 1951 and reached Los Angeles in 1953 -as bound to the 12-step doctrine that they critiqued. 16 AA encouraged confessional "sharing" but prevented "cross-talk" (the practice of directly discussing the content of AA members' confessions). Dederich and his initial followers came to believe that restricting cross-talk often meant substituting AA's general spiritual platitudes for difficult, direct, and highly personal conversations. They developed a new form of group therapy that encouraged "cross-talk" and confrontation in group sessions, which, according to group lore, were christened "synanons" by a tongue-tied addict's attempt to pronounce the word "seminar." The iconoclastic therapy worked; successfully clean addicts grew in number and the group grew in stature, eventually occupying a palatial former hotel on the Santa Monica beachfront by 1961. The "miracle on the beach" housed over one hundred "incorrigible" addicts who had apparently healed themselves through a novel combination of total detoxification, brutal honesty, honest labor, California sunshine, and charisma. The do-it-yourself addiction treatment invited encouraging investigations by Walter Cronkite, Life magazine, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 17 They also attracted professionals who brought credibility to the therapeutic experiment. In 1962, psychiatrist Daniel Casriel visited Synanon; before that visit, he held the typical professional opinion that "heroin addiction was incurable." 18 The months he spent observing Synanon changed his mind. The Synanon model continued to gain ground. In 1967 Daytop Village helped fund the establishment of a second treatment center, Phoenix House. Efren Ramierez, the New York City Commissioner of Addiction Services, endorsed the project, saying that "Every addict is curable until he proves otherwise." 21 Phoenix House embraced the Synanon method of "cure." The organization's first director, Mitchell Rosenthal, was a Navy psychiatrist and former Synanon affiliate. Rosenthal, however, was wary of being too closely associated with Synanon's anti-professional stance. He rejected the label "second-generation Synanons" as a descriptive term for Phoenix House and Daytop. 22 Instead, Rosenthal branded the organizations "therapeutic commu-nities," a term borrowed from a former mentor, British anti-psychiatry pioneer Maxwell Jones. 23 Rosenthal's tactical distance ultimately proved beneficial. By 1970 Synanon had turned away from its rehabilitative mission and had frightened many former supporters with apparently cult-like activities. Meanwhile, Phoenix House and Daytop opened new branches across the country, successfully institutionalizing the therapeutic community model. 24 tHe orIgIns of metHAdone mAIntenAnce Marie Nyswander began her career in the center of U.S. addiction treatment and research, housed in a narcotic penitentiary in Lexington, Kentucky. Nyswander later called her psychiatry internship at Lexington "the hardest year" of her life. She became disillusioned with both the injustices of the institutional setting and the obvious failure of psychoanalysis -the dominant treatment paradigm in her psychiatric circles -to address the problem of heroin addiction. 25 Nyswander's frustration with her residency led her to look for alternative forms of addiction treatment, just as early Synanon residents viewed their treatment model as a sharp contrast to their own failed stays at Lexington. Nyswander found her solution in methadone maintenance -and in Vincent Dole, the maintenance pioneer who became her second husband. The New York City Health Research Council funded Nyswander and Dole's observational research on the effects of various narcotics on addicts, including heroin, morphine, and finally, methadone. When addicts on methadone made drastic, positive behavioral changes, Nyswander and Dole's research turned experimental. In 1965, they published their data on twenty-two methadone patients in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), and used these results to advance a "metabolic theory" of addiction. 26 Notably, the JAMA study hinted that methadone could be used for crime reduction. Dole and Nyswander described four patients' heroin relapses as "unscheduled but perhaps necessary experiments," noting that the patients "discontinued these unrewarding experiments without the need for disciplinary measures." 27 The results of the study were cautiously optimistic, but the idea that an inexpensive medicine could rid addicts of their demons -and urban centers of addiction-related crime -enticed New York City's journalists and politicians. 28 The number of patients in New York City methadone programs increased almost tenfold by early 1970s, yet maintenance itself did not outpace the problems it was supposed to solve. 29 metAbolIc tHeory vs. "growIng up" New York City became a laboratory for the two competing treatment models in 1969, when Phoenix House champion Ramirez resigned and the city's first voluntary methadone clinic opened. TCs and methadone maintenance treatment both began to gain national reach, and they encountered similar arguments everywhere they opened. Congress convened hearings in 1969 and 1971, allowing TC and methadone advocates from New York and Washington D.C. an opportunity to debate the merits of each treatment model and press for federal and other funding. 30 Because the hearings took place before results of large-scale evaluation research were published, and few programs had more than five years of data to work with, the testimony tended to forefront philosophical differences rather than numbers. Each side made arguments based on fundamental premises about the nature of addiction, promising to produce formative research -and to bring hope. In 1969, investment in trial TCs and methadone programs were primarily local; the federal government funding remained relatively modest. When the Nixon administration put forth a new budget in 1971, however, they doubled federal drug spending to over $200 million, more than half of which were allocated to treatment. 31 But even before the funding boom, even hoped-for expansion brought complications, especially for methadone treatment. Historian Eric Schneider has argued that "[methadone] was far more effective than any other form of treatment and suffered mainly from having been overpromoted." 32 Yet methadone suffered just as much from the passionate responses its promotion evoked. Methadone maintenance appealed to a variety of interest groups, for fairly rational reasons. But the struggle with young TCs also had an emotional component with powerful political resonance. Early TC advocates (especially those who had personally experienced highs from substitute substances in Lexington or Fort Worth) viewed methadone as liberal indulgence and technocratic hubris, not the character-building discipline that they considered necessary for legitimate treatment. Because methadone maintenance was embraced by "old bureaucratic politicians" and big businesses, it represented "a failure of America's democracy. A failure of our wasting all this time sending people to the moon and not concentrating on things around here." 33 For TC advocates, the transformational solution to individual and social depravity would be grassroots and ground-up.
Synanon's shrewd marketers billed it as a "tunnel back to the human race" for heroin addicts trapped in a degenerate subculture. 34 Second-generation TCs likewise aimed for "habilitation," not "rehabilitation"; they operated under the assumption that the addicts who came to them were characterologically deficient and emotionally stunted. Cure took the form of a miraculous personal rebirth. As a Daytop brochure explained, To effectuate treatment, one must first remove the encapsulating shell. Then, once exposed to the light of reality, powerless to isolate himself without his fortressprison, he is in a position to be taught how to grow up. For the primary addict, also called the "street" addict, a full-time institutional therapeutic environment must be utilized to enable the individual to grow up and develop emotionally, sexually, vocationally and educationally. This is no small undertaking, but nothing less will suffice. 35 Second-generation TCs such as Daytop, Phoenix House, and Odyssey House, all employed confrontational "encounter" therapies designed to break down the addict's "shell." They also shared with early Synanon two primary rules: no violence, and no drugs -including methadone. As Daniel Casriel told Congress, "methadone will prevent stealing, but it doesn't cure [the addict's] personality. No chemical does. The thing that drove them to search out heroin is still driving them. Long before they took heroin they were not functioning effectively, either vocationally or socially."
36 Therapeutic community advocates on both coasts called methadone a crutch, a band-aid, a handkerchief, and an alcohol rub. 37 It looked like medicine, but failed to address the underlying causes of addiction, which TC advocates believed were spiritual and characterological. Critics borrowed an analogy from Alcoholics Anonymous's Big Book and compared supplying heroin addicts with methadone to "switching an alcoholic from scotch to cheap wine."
38 They told horror stories about children getting into methadone-laced orange juice 39 and expressed concern for the well-being of fetuses exposed to the drug in utero long before fetal alcohol syndrome was a widely recognized condition. 40 Born into a chemically saturated culture, innocents with the propensity for chemical addiction would need a therapeutic retreat to get out of it.
Methadone maintenance advocates called these arguments biased hysteria, and they countered them with quantitative data. In 1964, one year after Daytop Village was founded in New York, Dole and Nyswander launched their methadone maintenance program. Their first twenty-two methadone patients experienced remarkable results; unlike patients "maintained" on heroin (a mainstay of the British system of drug control), patients stabilized on 80-120 mg of methadone were "blockaded" from the euphoric experience associated with heroin injection. Once stabilized, the threat of withdrawal receded and criminal behavior -believed to be inspired by illegal drug-seeking, not personality defects -ceased. The researchers further theorized that, once exposed to narcotics, addicts underwent a permanent metabolic change. After that change, they needed the drugs in a visceral way, just as "a diabetic needs insulin." 41 Dole and Nyswander's participant pool grew into the hundreds, and the positive results scaled up to higher sample sizes. The expanded studies tracked arrest records of heroin users maintained on methadone. In 1968, after measuring the employment and crime status of 750 methadone patients over a four year period, Dole reported "unequivocally" that "criminal addicts can be rehabilitated by a well-supervised maintenance program." Eighty-eight percent of the patients were "socially acceptable, maintaining arrest-free records since admission," while a subset of fifty-nine percent had become "productive members of society" by gaining and maintaining employment. 42 Researchers used this evidence to suggest that methadone was a solution for crime and -if not exactly a cure -a workable treatment for a chronic disease (Figure 1 ). 43 The local methadone-aided "cures" attracted national attention. The Narcotic Rehabilitation Act (NARA), passed by Congress in 1966, granted federal courts the right to compel addicts to participate in addiction treatment. The law was supposedly a more sympathetic alternative to criminal drug sentences, but it continued to funnel addicts into the newly designated "clinical research centers" at the U.S. Public Health Service hospital/penitentiary in Lexington. The residential care that addicts received at Lexington had more in common with the therapeutic community model; philosophically compatible local programs supported by the National Institute of Mental Health provided "aftercare" treatment. Some political conservatives saw prison as preferable to methadone not because it functioned as simple punishment or deterrent, but because it was part of what they saw as a valuable effort at rebuilding moral character. Seen as a benign extension of the "growing up" process, the therapeutic community model could be viewed as appropriate treatment for "atrisk" young adults from middle class families, despite its links to the criminal justice system. TC proponents, for their part, refused to recognize the concept of acceptable (i.e., iatrogenic or purely physiological) addiction; any form of drug dependence, to them, always signified underlying psychological or spiritual ills, regardless of the addict's success in avoiding consequences. Drug use was a personal failing that could only be cured through re-socialization into appropriate community norms.
Vincent Dole challenged this theory at a congressional subcommittee hearing in 1971. His pilot study data failed to convince his conservative audience, so Dole used an anecdote to argue that addicts could be referred to methadone maintenance as a form of civil commitment. Dole told the story of a "tough Irish kid," a high-school dropout and heroin addict who had been jailed twice for stealing and who had failed at previous attempts at detoxification. Seven years into methadone treatment, the "kid" had a wife, a family, and a college degree in aeronautical engineering. "Now," Dole asked Republican Representative Robert McClory, "is he rehabilitated?" 44 "My answer to that," replied McClory, "would be that from the standpoint of rehabilitation from narcotics, no, he isn't." The boy's continued reliance on the drug -perceived as an "easy way out" of addiction -undermined Dole's uplifting story. McClory continued, "Sure, we can rehabilitate persons by putting them on another form of drugs or, I suppose, through the British system of letting heroin be received free of charge and thereby rehabilitate a criminal. He won't be out stealing in order to support his addiction. But that isn't the kind of rehabilitation we had in mind: no." 45 Conservatives had in mind a "slow gradual [program] which required a lot of spiritual and mental rehabilitation, a change in attitude and thinking, an aftercare program." 46 Dole's data failed to move McClory, who admitted that he would sooner send his son to a NARA-designated research center than to Dole's methadone program. 47 And Dole had ample data: prior to 1965, JAMA had published just three articles on methadone; from 1965-71, the journal published seven times that many. Metabolic theory, however, did not make sense to audiences who were predisposed to moral or developmental explanations for addiction. As scientific consensus about methadone's efficacy emerged, therapeutic community advocates continued to traffic in narratives of personal reformation rather than data. fAItH or record-keepIng: A relIgIous wAr? The question about which treatment model worked better was not merely a technocratic issue; the evidence had larger implications for national drug policy. Drug addiction was a major issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and approaches to it continued to be strongly politicized. One survey found that drug addiction rated third in a list of issues that most concerned the American public, behind only the economy and the Vietnam war; the article surmised that the Nixon administration's attempts to combat heroin addiction were likely to become a potent issue in the upcoming election. 48 Some scholars likened the philosophical and funding conflict between TCs and methadone to another kind of war. Herman Joseph, then-supervisor of New York City's probation office, told Congress that "In some quarters the medication of methadone is looked upon as heretical, and opposition to it has taken on the proportions of a virtual religious war." 49 Joseph's metaphor was apt, for therapeutic communities in the late 1960s were taking on a distinctly religious cast. Synanon grew increasingly cultish while its east coast progeny supported the transformative capabilities of their confrontational therapies with allusions to traditional, "historically tested" religious practices. Social scientists had long investigated "addictive personalities," but therapeutic community directors preferred the language of "character," a quality shaped by religious ritual for centuries.
The focus on transformation created awkward partnerships in the TC establishment, as the concept proved equally compelling to religious conservatives and social reformers. The two groups eventually clashed in a high profile schism at Daytop in 1968. Executive board member Monsignor William O'Brien and Daytop's second director, David Deitch, clashed over Deitch's left-wing political views and policies. Both men believed strongly that confrontational therapy, like the Catholic sacraments of confession and reconciliation, was a powerful ritual for spiritual cleansing. But for Deitch, the therapeutic community had as much to do with consciousness-raising as with enlightenment. Deitch partnered with a group of Black Panthers who were similarly critical of mainstream society's complicity with drug use; O'Brien preferred the Pope. 50 After Deitch was ousted, the organization became aligned with O'Brien's philosophy. Conservative elements of the emerging TC establishment, in other words, eclipsed countercultural ones. This association with established religious traditions gave therapeutic communities a kind of legitimacy beyond their own ranks, but it also aroused suspicion, as groups like the ACLU questioned whether civil commitment to addiction TCs violated religious freedom. 51 The spiritual awakenings promised by the TC model proved difficult to legislate.
They were equally difficult to track. Therapeutic communities were notorious for spotty residential records. Early TC professionals claimed that longterm, residential treatment of at least one year, often two was necessary for the complete socialization of addicts. Anything less amounted to a half-dose.
This philosophy biased the results of TC efficacy studies: residents who left the therapeutic community before the recommended "graduation" date were not factored into TC data. The majority of therapeutic community residents left within the first three months; therefore published results of initial studies only pertained to a self-selecting minority of the addicted population. Inferences about this population were further compromised by the difficulty of locating former residents after graduation. Loss to follow-up bias was a major problem, since the programs' main metric was based on the long-lasting transformation of former residents.
Ten years after Daytop's incorporation, a researcher affiliated with the Canadian Addiction Research Foundation surveyed the available TC efficacy studies, analyzing the success rates of Synanon, Daytop, Phoenix House and several other US-based, second-generation TCs. The author lamented the paucity of available data, including an absence of controlled studies of TCs that were unaffiliated with correctional institutions. The survey concluded that TCs generally had low retention and graduation rates and limited success in preparing residents for employment outside addiction treatment agencies. The initial Daytop follow-up studies conducted after Deitch's departure had low response rates, "no check of addict statements with official records," and "information for splitees [program drop-outs] so incomplete as to be unreliable." 52 Since their inception, methadone clinics had been highly regulated medical enterprises; in contrast, early TCs relied on stories of personal transformation rather than statistics. In 1971, Daniel Casriel and his colleague Daniel Amen published a book, Daytop: Three Addicts and their Cure, that recounted the recovery trajectories of three Daytop residents. Before Daytop, said one former resident, "we were like vegetables with big dreams. We weren't doing anything." By spending time in the TC, "you suddenly go back to simple things you never felt before. And you start from there. It's so different from the old way." 53 Publishing detailed studies of several successful cases was standard practice for members of the psychiatric establishment like Casriel. TC research did undergo a subtle transformation when psychologist George Deleon of Phoenix House began to investigate the mechanisms of TC-facilitated recovery. Deleon hypothesized that cathartic confrontational group therapies relieved stress, and he measured blood pressure before and after the sessions to test this theory. 54 He operationalized characterological transformation by administering a psychopathology scale to Phoenix House residents, ultimately identifying an association between length of stay and decreased pathology scores. 55 Deleon published two years' worth of Dole-like efficacy data in a 1971 issue of the JAMA; these "systemically gathered" arrest records for program dropouts, late-stage residents, and graduates demonstrated an association between length of stay and decreased post-program arrests, even among "splitees." 56 Whether TCs were more efficacious than methadone clinics in this respect, however, remained an open question.
Historians and addiction scientists have long criticized therapeutic communities for spotty efficacy data and vague descriptions of therapeutic processes. 57 Yet the ideological underpinnings of methadone research became equally apparent as methadone treatment transitioned from a quasi-experimental study to a large-scale social program. Methadone programs kept extensive patient records, partly due to federal regulations and partly due to their primary occupation: the functioning of patients currently taking part in methadone treatment. Few methadone studies examined the outcome of patients who terminated treatment, leading critics to suggest that methadone advocates were complacent enablers of life-long dependence on the drug. The early methadone studies were also subject to selection bias: initially, long waits on the rolls for few spots in the available treatment programs selected for heroin users who were highly motivated to begin treatment. Later, some users would admit to using methadone to help lessen their dependency on heroin, thus liberating them to enjoy other drugs recreationally. Methadone programs might have rebutted this critique with ample urinalysis data, but initial studies failed to do so. The programs also were initially unconcerned with the use of other nonprescribed drugs -a central preoccupation of the recovery model promoted by drug-free therapeutic communities. 58 Dole and Nyswander supported methadone maintenance with data and theory, and illustrated their results with descriptions of individuals' behavioral changes. Dole and Nyswander did not mention spiritual transformation in their 1965 article; instead, they simply pronounced that their first twenty-two patients had "ceased to behave as addicts." The article reported that twentyone of twenty-two initial methadone patients were either gainfully employed or looking for work. 59 These were not conversion narratives. The only religious aspect of the therapy was, perhaps, the zeal of its proponents (one New York resident likened successful methadone maintainers to "missionaries" who returned to their old neighborhoods to preach the gospel of metabolic stability).
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The zeal was not limited to ex-addicts and doctors. Researchers lined up to study the new patients who entered methadone programs in the mid-1960s. The First National Conference on Methadone Treatment was held a few months before the publication of Dole and Nyswander's 1968 crime-based efficacy study; at that time there just a handful of Washington, D.C. addicts enrolled in a single methadone treatment program. When the third conference met in 1970, more than 2,300 people were enrolled in the city's programs, and Robert DuPont (who would be named Nixon's second "Drug Czar" and the inaugural director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse in 1973) presented a study that tracked declining crime rates alongside the scaled-up methadone program. 61 DuPont, then head of the city's Narcotics Treatment Administration, cited methadone as a critical part of "how corrections can beat the high cost of heroin addiction." Still, DuPont noted, by 1971 it had already become clear that methadone was "no panacea." 62 In 1976, Vincent Dole reflected on ten years of methadone treatment, noting the success of the pilot methadone programs from 1965 to 1970. He argued that because of government meddling and the rapid expansion of methadone clinics over the next three years, many of the programs had "lost their ability to attract and rehabilitate addicts." 63 Making matters worse, he argued, was increasingly skeptical media coverage and the changing perception of the addicts themselves, as methadone failed to live up to its earlier reputation. The enlightened, technocratic, consensus-driven liberalism that characterized midcentury politics was also showing signs of strain as crime rates rose and partisan political discourse grew increasingly paranoid. 64 Dole hypothesized that skepticism and conspiracy theories -of babies born addicted to methadone, guileless suburban teens hooked on methadone, the creation of a methadone shadow market, and even the notion that methadone was a form of government mind control -were important preconditions for the unsatisfactory relapse rates among 6,000 New York addicts who entered treatment in 1972. 65 Despite their supposed failures, both treatment models endured. A few farsighted researchers took an ecumenical approach. Jerome Jaffe attracted the attention of the Nixon administration when -along with an illustrious staff that included Deitch, following his break with Daytop -he successfully managed a multimodal treatment program that offered methadone and therapeutic community programs, despite initial resistance from stakeholders who viewed methadone as a "substitute addiction." 66 The goal of the project was to "attempt to serve the needs of the patient rather than the needs of the personnel operating treatment programs," wrote Jaffe. 67 In order to gain more comprehensive data about which treatments worked best for particular patient populations, in 1969 the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) contracted with Texas Christian University to produce a large-scale evaluation study of the drug treatment models employed by 52 agencies taking part in the Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP). The study concluded that drug treatment had the greatest effects on welfare enrollment, opiate use reduction, maintaining employment, and decreasing alcohol use, non-opiate substance use, and illegal activities. "Treatment effects on arrests and jail were negligible," the authors wrote. Yet this analysis of variance mattered little to government officials; by the time the results were published, their primary concern was crime. 68 crIme As tHe bottom lIne And tHe tAmIng of treAtment rAdIcAlIsm Methadone and TCs both had the potential to develop into truly revolutionary types of treatment. When outcome measures were reduced to criminal recidivism, however, much of the creative potential that came with moving addiction treatment out of the criminal justice system was lost. Treatment pioneers tried to leverage the issue of addiction to redress more philosophical and social issues, but this opportunity was ultimately seized by those with more political power, who guided new treatment research to their own ends.
Those ends did not include a wholesale rethinking of the licit drug establishment and the pharmaceutical industry. David Herzberg has documented how, in crafting the 1965 Drug Abuse Control Amendments, pharmaceutical companies, politicians, and addiction scientists acknowledged that minor tranquilizers such as Valium had a "potential for abuse." The Drug Abuse Control bill of 1970 outlined a drug schedule that matched drugs with criminal repercussions based on this "potential," then undermined condemnation of licit drugs by including a less severe category created just for minor tranquilizers (the so-called "Roche schedule.") 69 Several years before the hysteria surrounding tranquilizer use amongst white, middle class women appeared in staid periodicals like Good Housekeeping and Redbook, ex-addicts (some of them former Synanon members) employed by therapeutic communities in the late 1960s critiqued the depravity of a drug-saturated mainstream culture. Exaddicts crafted these critiques of mainstream culture even as they promoted the TC model's efficacy in helping them conform to it. In 1969, ex-addict Samuel Anglin minimized the importance of chemical effects and emphasized the influence of a dysfunctional culture:
We have to find out what it is in our culture and the attitudes of our culture that encourages drug abuse. And you see it on television and everything else: you take the little blue pill if you get up tight. You see it about Compoz: it doesn't bother him, the war and everything, because he takes Compoz. If we keep dealing with this problem chemically, we will in 20 years have a bunch of people sitting around tranquilized not caring about anything.
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Conservative and liberal drug-free ideologues disagreed on which issues were worth examining, but both sets of arguments considered the physical properties of the chemicals as less important than their symbolic function -as, indeed, a sign of false consciousness. Monsignor William O'Brien, like Anglin, viewed the therapeutic community as a response to the "loneliness and alienation" of modern life. "The elimination of the symptom," he proclaimed, "be it substance abuse or other disorders, is only part of the treatment."
71 TC proponents departed from psychoanalysts, who believed psychological revelation was the key to alleviating the expression of addiction. TC advocates framed the "truth" at the center of addiction recovery as the total alignment of personal behavior with the community's particular moral philosophy.
Therapeutic communities were perceived as a promising treatment model as long as their philosophies were uncontroversial and the methods used to achieve behavior change seemed reasonable. And "uncontroversial" ultimately meant "conservative." Highly punitive, socially conservative, explicitly Christian organizations later adapted the TC model for "at-risk" youth, yet criticism took decades to surface; many liberal politicians were unwilling to take the political risk of challenging any component of the "drug war" agenda. 72 The TC approach for treating addiction proved to be most acceptable to social authorities when residents were socialized into appropriate religious and gender roles along with their new abstemious behaviors. For better or worse, the Synanon model of social experimentation -which involved alternative family, labor, and educational structures -was not replicated or faithfully amended. Additionally, the "community" itself became a bounded entity, delineated by funding structures as well as walls. Deitch's model of TC residents as "change agents" who challenged mainstream culture and impacted local neighborhoods was short-lived; as TCs became established as legitimate agencies, "community" was largely reduced to an efficacious method of delivering addiction treatment for the individuals that entered it. 73 This efficacy, moreover, came to be defined in terms of individual recidivism, not social or cultural changes. Though TC advocates raised awareness about a drugsaturated society, for the most part politicians turned the attention back to incorrigible individuals. Some TC proponents changed direction in response. Judianne Densen-Gerber, the psychiatrist who directed Odyssey House, argued in favor of using civil commitment of individual addicts to bolster the client base of the emergent private addiction treatment industry. 74 In a 1971 discussion of the expansion of civil commitment for addiction treatment, one Republican congressman concluded that addiction was an epidemic and that forced treatment was a justifiable "quarantine of people who are sick and infect others with this sickness wherever they go."
75 Addiction was framed as a problem of contagious agents rather than social environments. Rhetorically, transformative countercultures became quarantine wards.
Methadone's liberalism might also have been pushed further left. When the racial and socioeconomic make-up of the methadone patient population crystallized in the early 1970s, delivering a medication looked more like social justice work. Methadone tended to treat the most abject addicts -the so-called "street addicts," who were usually older and nonwhite.
76 Liberals who were attentive to issues of racial justice embraced the de-stigmatizing implications of the programs. Historian Caroline Acker has argued that one significant legacy of methadone maintenance was its usefulness for later arguments in favor of harm reduction -including calls for needle exchanges or even drug legalization. 77 When local groups picketed outside of methadone clinics in New York City, leftist editorials in the Village Voice used the controversy as an opportunity to advocate for the British model of heroin maintenance and decriminalization. 78 These left-wing advocates of methadone maintenance had shifted their perspective by the early 1970s, however, turning their attention away from the chemical properties of the drugs and instead focusing on minimizing the harms associated with them. Nearly twenty years later, Robert DuPont reflected that his endorsement of methadone treatment and marijuana decriminalization caused him to be wrongly "seen by many as part of the group that supported harm reduction." 79 He had since been convinced that most forms of harm reduction increased criminal behavior and social dysfunction and undermined norms that discouraged substance use.
Methadone was an exception. DuPont did not repudiate methadone mainte-nance, though he came to favor "stricter" programs than the ones he pioneered -programs that screened for any form of drug use and "imposed sanctions for failure to meet program goals." Methadone, he argued, could be successfully used to promote "prosocial values, including cessation of criminal behavior." 80 Both Dupont and Jaffe acknowledged the value of probationary drug treatment during in the 1971 congressional hearings. But the nuances of this approach were later lost. Nixon "was a man who knew that the public wanted simple statements [about drug policy] and you would have to speak to them in that way," said Jaffe years later. "The rhetoric had to be simple; behind the rhetoric [about criminality] he knew the complexities of what had to be done." 81 Some academic scholarship also simplified the problem by emphasizing the criminal element of addiction and overlooking other variables. The American Journal of Public Health published a ten-year follow up study of 500 Beth Israel methadone patients in 1972; like early methadone and TC outcome studies, the article discussed criminal behavior (incarceration) as a primary health outcome. 82 Though incarceration was framed as a negative health outcome for addicts in 1972, in the following decades prisons would increasingly become treatment providers for addicts and the mentally ill. 83 The eventual integration of methadone and therapeutic community programs into the prison system ran counter to the intentions of early treatment providers.
The new addiction treatment programs operated in the era of de-institutionalization, and so were not alone in providing psychiatric services to local populations. Therapeutic community and methadone maintenance promoters offered variations on community psychiatry rhetoric. TC and methadone proponents placed an emphasis on cure rather than incarceration, much like advocates of the community psychiatry centers promoted by the National Institute of Mental Health in 1962. The earlier policies might have inspired a more holistic concept of cure, one that included a complete reintegration into society, participation in the labor force, and even a healthy family life. 84 Methadone and TC proponents each claimed the opposing treatment failed by this metric: half-cures kept patients reliant on treatment services, rather than reintegrating patients into their families and society. One TC proponent argued, "you get a kid at sixteen and he gets on methadone and he lives to be fifty-six and the prognosis is he stays on methadone; how can he take a vacation or do anything?" 85 Barry Stimmel, co-director of Mt. Sinai's methadone clinic, countered that his program could "show the addict he is indeed able to be a functioning member of society and able to stay with his family and not be interred in a closed artificial community and that he is not degraded and need not defeat himself. All this is done without removing the addicted individual from his family unit." 86 Ironically, despite the programs' pledges to return addicts to their families, ultimately the promises of both TC and methadone maintenance were eclipsed by the swift return to carceral drug control strategies designed to remove drug users from their communities.
conclusIon The supposedly rational, humanitarian approach that emerged from the conflict between TC and methadone treatment models was eventually compromised. Rather than emphasizing the humanitarian argument that worked so well in alcoholism advocacy -that the alcoholic was "sick and worthy of saving" -the political success of methadone rested on the argument that it would bring down crime. 87 Many medical authorities and consultants hoped that methadone could be used as a lure to attract and maintain street addicts in rehabilitation programs. Methadone might link street addicts to other social services, making metabolic stability a basis for social uplift. Unfortunately, the Nixon administration was interested in low crime rates, not the moral or even socioeconomic progress of drug users. Methadone advocates accordingly pitched the clinics as part of an "anti-crime" initiative rather than as a "rehabilitation" program. Critic Edward Jay Epstein wrote, "The net result was that those with the technical competence to see the limits of methadone treatment chose not to deflate the unrealistic claim that methadone would substantially reduce crime." 88 TC advocates who lacked "technical competence" had nevertheless pointed out that methadone, as a single-drug solution to heroin dependence, was useless in treating the supposed personality defects that also lead to addiction to psychedelics and stimulants. But by the early 1970s, the public -even the supposedly enlightened liberal community -was becoming less worried about alleviating the condition of addiction than in addressing its consequences. Popular media coverage of addiction treatment was no longer so hopeful.
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The New York Times featured a Lower East Side resident with little interest in the basic causes of addiction or in the humane treatment of addicts. "I wouldn't care if someone came along with a machine gun and killed all of them," he said in 1971. "I've been robbed, my wife has been robbed -I'm sorry, I just don't care any more." 90 Unfortunately, as methadone maintenance advocates well knew, a simple chemical solution was an inadequate response to the era's trends in drug use and crime. Some historians argue that when the Rockefeller Drugs Laws were passed in 1973, the treatment revolution was over before it started.
91 Conservatives such as Governor Ronald Reagan de-funded local methadone clinics and adopted other measures for controlling drug-related crime. 92 Therapeutic communities fit well with those measures. The 1970s "neoclassical" era of drug control ushered in mandatory sentences for drug possession and a militaristic focus on drug trafficking that functioned as addiction prevention. TCs' emphasis on moral development and disciplinary structure meant that therapeutic communities were viewed as an ideal setting for middle-class, wayward youths and prisoners convicted of drug related crimes. In 1975, investigations into the harsh disciplinary measures employed in some therapeutic communities lead to the creation of the Therapeutic Communities Association (TCA) and a code of ethics for TC treatment providers. 93 It did not lead to a substantial reduction of TC-inspired programs in prisons, however, as advocates successfully continued to pitch the programs as a form of punishment as well as rehabilitation. Prison-based therapeutic communities still exist today -and many of these programs also use methadone. 94 In 1971, as chief of Nixon's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP), Jerome Jaffe did not limit the federal drug treatment strategy to a single therapeutic model. Instead, he hoped research and programmatic support would help cities and states develop a variety of evidence-based programs. He was partly right; methadone and TC purists put aside some differences and treatment programs grew into institutions. Vincent Dole and William O'Brien were willing to share the stage at national addiction conferences in the 1980s, by which time the curtain was lowering on the renewed promises of addiction treatment. 95 David Deitch, echoing Vincent Dole, acknowledged that the language of cure is "better gone" -but there were, of course, costs to its elimination. 96 Therapeutic communities and methadone maintenance clinics were designed to be affordable and accessible in their infancy. Public funding was available, and addiction treatment was too new for tiers. The methadone and TC models both faced competition on two fronts in later years: from upscale, private treatment centers who "siphoned off" financially comfortable patients with insurance, and from the correctional system, which increasingly took drug users out of the patient pool by incarcerating them on minor possession charges. The result was a two-tier system of "treatment for the middle and upper classes, and incarceration for most others." 97 Methadone clinic and therapeutic communities marked the end of the classic era of narcotics control, but the influences of these prominent treatment models on the institutional infrastructure that ultimately emerged in the following decades was mixed. American TCs did not revolutionize the psychiatric profession, and in fact were fairly insulated from the field of mental health in general. "TCs came out of corrections," said Charles Devlin, the first Daytop patient and its lifelong director, citing probation and parole officers' initial influence in promoting the model. 98 So did methadone, if critics like Epstein are to be believed. For alcohol and drug historians writing under the glare of recent history, the more appropriate question might be whether they ever left.
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